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"The rule of law has often been reiterated that, in the absence of
compelling reasons [to the contrary], the welfare of children of tender age
is best promoted by giving custody to the mother." 1 This rule, known as
the tender years doctrine, has been applied by Pennsylvania courts to the
full range of child custody litigation-adoption proceedings, 2 parent
versus non-parent disputes, 3 and parent versus parent contests. 4 The
facile manner in which the doctrine has been applied by the courts has
drawn severe criticism.' Its proper role has yet to be determined; for
although it has been called "one of the strongest presumptions of the
law," 6 three justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have declared it
to be "offensive to the concept of the equality of the sexes which we have
embraced as a constitutional principle within this jurisdiction. "7 This
comment will examine the tender years doctrine as applied in custody
proceedings between parents: its breadth, its current status in recent
Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases, and some possible ways in which its
application may be challenged.
II. Extent of the Doctrine's Application
A. Competing Interests in Child Custody Disputes
Viewing the custody determination solely, or even primarily, as the
resolution of the parents' conflicting interests obscures the ultimate objec-
tive, the best interests of the child. Because each adult party to the
litigation is called upon to establish his or her credentials as the more
1. Commonwealth ex rel. Blatt v. Blatt, 168 Pa. Super. Ct. 427, 428, 79 A.2d 126, 127
(1951).
2. Albee Appeal, 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 370, 150 A.2d 563 (1959).
3. Commonwealth ex rel. Tucker v. Salinger, - Pa. Super. Ct. - ,366 A.2d 286
(1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 297, 150 A.2d 724
(1959).
4. E.g., Urbani v. Bates, 395 Pa. 187, 149 A.2d 644 (1959).
5. Foster & Freed, Children and the Law, 2 FAMILY L.Q. 40, 47 (1968).
6. Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 450 Pa. 352, 355, 299 A.2d 243, 245
(1973).
7. Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, - Pa. -- , 368 A.2d 635 (1977).
appropriate future custodian of the child, the resolution of the custody
dispute takes on the aura of a declaration of a victor in this final battle of
the broken marriage. The rights of either parent, however, must be
viewed in light of the interests of both the child and the state in the
determination of future custody.
8
As between the parents, the father's right to the custody and control
of the children of the marriage were the first to be recognized by the
English common law. 9 Nineteenth century Pennsylvania courts initiated a
trend away from the absolute supremacy of the father's rights in custody
decisions by looking to the interests of the child"a and of the state.11 That
change in the law was recognized in the Act of 1895, which equalized the
rights of the parents12 and directed the courts to look to the "fitness of
such parent and the best interests and permanent welfare of [the] child." 13
One presumption relied upon to facilitate custody decisions in the context
of equal parental rights was the tender years doctrine. The number of
cases relying on this doctrine increased, however, until the "best inter-
ests" of the child became subordinate and were frequently ignored. 14 The
ultimate result of the rejection of the father's superior right to custody of
the child was the establishment of the primacy of the mother's right to
custody under the tender years doctrine.15
The tender years doctrine does not effectuate the interests of the state
or the child but rather serves as an excuse for not inquiring into those
interests in a determination of future custody. The state's interest was
expressed under the doctrine of parens patriae in early Pennsylvania
decisions:
[T]he principle of the controlling power of the state as parens
patriae, look[s] . . . to the defense of those who are unable to
defend themselves, and to the interest which society has in the
proper care and training of children upon whom it is to depend
for its future existence.'
6
8. Sweeney, Habeas Corpus-Custody of Children, 22 TEMP. L.Q. 289, 299 (1949).
9. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452-53.
The ancient Roman laws gave the father a power of life and death over his
children upon this principle, that he who gave had also the power of taking away.
The power of a [male) parent by our English laws is much more moderate; but
still sufficient to keep the child in order and obedience.
Id.
10. Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binney 519 (Pa. 1813).
If. Commonwealth ex rel. Hart v. Hart, 14 Phila. 352 (Pa. Quarter Sessions 1880).
12. "[T]he mother of a minor child . . . shall have the same and equal right to its
custody . . . [as] the father .... - Act of June 26, 1895, P.L. 316, No. 232, § 1. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 48, § 91 (Purdon 1965).
13. Act of June 26, 1895, P.L. 316, No. 232, § I. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 92 (Purdon
1965).
14. Foster & Freed, supra note 5, at 47.
15. Commonwealth ex rel. Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super. Ct. 210, 166 A.2d 60
(1966). "One of the strongest presumptions in our law is that a mother has a prima facie right
to her children over any other person." Id. at 215, 166 A.2d at 64.
16. Commonwealth ex rel. Hart v. Hart, 14 Phila. 352, 356 (Pa. Quarter Sessions
1880).
The state expresses its interest largely through the courts' exercise of
governmental authority in making determinations of custody. 7 That
authority places the state in the role of the ultimate guardian of all
children within its jurisdiction and the final arbiter of the proper manner
of raising those children.' 8 By blindly exercising such power upon an
application of the presumption of the tender years doctrine the courts
defeat the very reason for the existence of that power: "the defense of
those who are unable to defend themselves."'
9
While the state's interests are aimed at protecting the child, the
child's interests in self-development may diverge from the interpretation
of "the interest society has in the proper . . . training of children upon
whom it is to depend for its future existence.''20 The requirement of
compelling reasons to the contrary to defeat the presumption of the tender
years doctrine encourages courts to test the reasons to the contrary against
the mother's rights and against society's interest in the maintenance of the
status quo. Furthermore, the tender years doctrine places upon the father
a burden that can be overcome only by demonstrating the deficiencies of
the mother. The custody litigation is then deflected from a consideration
of the child's best interests, as the parents' attorneys direct their efforts
toward proving the other parent's unfitness as a custodian. Although the
permanent welfare of the child has frequently been called the "guiding
star"'" and the paramount issue influencing a custody award,2 2 reality
differs from those idealistic declarations of judicial intention.2 3 The
uncritical acceptance of the tender years doctrine permitted judges to
avoid the difficulty of identifying the child's interests and the best method
of serving them by presuming that the best interests of the child were
served by awarding custody to the mother. The child's lack of an advo-
cate of his or her own "eliminated in practice the distinction between
advancing the child's best interests and treating him as a chattel." 24
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1888 (Purdon 1967). The state's power is sufficient to
overcome the parents' prior agreements concerning custody, Williams v. Williams, 223 Pa.
Super. Ct. 29, 296 A.2d 870 (1972), the custody decrees of foreign jurisdictions, Common-
wealth ex rel. Thomas v. Gillard, 203 Pa. Super. Ct. 95, 198 A.2d 377 (1964), and prior
custody determinations by the same court, Commonwealth v. Addicks & Lee, 2 S. & R. 174
(Pa. 1815). The power of the courts is limited by judicial recognition of the probable
psychological harm resulting from a change of custody, Commonwealth ex rel. Shipp v.
Shipp, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 58, 223 A.2d 906 (1966), and of a sufficient right to custody in the
natural parents to preclude sanctioning of abductions by non-parents. Cf. Commonwealth
ex rel. Martin v. Blough, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 346, 349, 191 A.2d 918, 919 (1963).
18. Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Society v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300
(1949).
19. Commonwealth ex rel. Hart v. Hart, 14 Phila. 352, 356 (Pa. Quarter Sessions
1880).
20. Id.; Commonwealth ex rel. Gilkeson v. Gilkeson, I Phila. 194 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1851).
21. Commonwealth ex rel. McTighe v. McTighe, 156 Pa. Super. Ct. 560, 40 A.2d 881
(1945).
22. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Bell v. Bell, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 646, 189 A.2d 908
(1963).
23. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the State, 4
FAMILY L.Q. 319 (1970).
24. Id. at 337.
Paramountcy of the child's interests can be assured by eliminating the
presumption of the tender years doctrine and in fact recognizing an
equality of right between the parents as to future custody of the child.
B. Applicability and Effect of the Tender Years Doctrine
The impact of the tender years doctrine upon the divergent interests
present in a custody dispute is apparent from the preceding brief discus-
sion of those interests.25 That impact remains only a potential in a
particular custody dispute until certain criteria, which activate the pre-
sumption, have been met. Whether the tender years doctrine is conceived
as a strong presumption that the mother is entitled to custody26 or a
procedural rule to be applied only when other considerations are equally
balanced, 27 those same criteria-the age28 and sex2 9 of the child and the
mother's conduct 3 -- determine its applicability. Variations in these fac-
tors have not necessarily defeated the doctrine but were the basis of
arguments to weaken the presumption in individual cases.
31
1. Age and Sex of the Child.-In Pennsylvania the tender years
doctrine is a potential factor in every custody case until the child is
fourteen years old. 32 The tender years doctrine applies equally to children
of either sex. 3 3 If the child is a girl, however, the rule that "a child of
tender years should be committed to the care and custody of its mother,
by whom the needs of the child are ordinarily best served . . . is
especially true." 34 The extreme forcefulness of the doctrine in cases
concerning girls was demonstrated in Commonwealth ex rel. Shipp v.
Shipp. 3 In this case the superior court apparently relied solely on the
tender years doctrine to reverse an award of custody to the father even
though "the immoral environment surrounding the mother was not good
for the child" 36 and the mother-appellant had not shown an error of law or
25. See notes 8-24 and accompanying text supra.
26. Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 450 Pa. 352, 299 A.2d 243 (1973).
27. Commonwealth ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh, 449 Pa. 105, 296 A.2d 625 (1972).
28. Commonwealth ex rel. Skurat v. Gearhart, 178 Pa. Super. Ct. 245, 115 A.2d 395
(1955).
29. Commonwealth ex rel. Horton v. Burke, 190 Pa. Super. Ct. 392, 154 A.2d 255
(1959).
30. Commonwealth ex rel. Rainford v. Cirillo, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 591, 296 A.2d 838
(1972).
31. Compare Carlisle Appeal, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 181, 310 A.2d 280 (1973) (boys ages
12 & 13 to father) with Commonwealth ex rel. Skurat v. Gearhart, 178 Pa. Super. Ct. 245,
115 A.2d 395 (1955) (boys ages 12 & 13 to mother) and Commonwealth ex rel. Kevitch v.
McCue, 165 Pa. Super. Ct. 49, 67 A.2d 582 (1949) (twin girls age 2'/h to mother with history of
prostitution and drug addiction).
32. Commonwealth ex rel. Skurat v. Gearhart, 178 Pa. Super. Ct. 245, 115 A.2d 395
(1955) (boys ages 12 & 13). Other jurisdictions do not apply the rule so broadly. Cf. Russell
v. Russell, 20 Cal. App. 457, 129 P. 467 (Dist. Ct. of App. 1913) (boy age 10 to father);
Chatwood v. Chatwood, 44 Wash. 2d 233, 266 P.2d 782 (1954) (girl age 5 to father).
33. Cf. Commonwealth ex ret. Horton v. Burke, 190 Pa. Super. Ct. 392, 395, 154 A.2d
255, 256 (1959).
34. Id.
35. 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 58, 223 A.2d 906 (1966).
36. Id. at 62, 223 A.2d at 908.
fact in the lower court's decision. 37 At least one later case concerning
young girls affirmed a custody award to their mothers with the simple
statement that it was in accord with the tender years doctrine.
38
2. The Mother's Conduct.-The fitness of the parents is directly
in issue in all custody cases. 39 This permits judicial inquiry into all facets
of the individual parent's conduct.' The tender years doctrine, in effect,
places the burden of proving the mother is unfit on the father. His proof
must evidence compelling reasons to deny custody to the mother in order
to overcome the presumption in her favor. 4 If the evidence on the
parents' fitness is merely in balance, the doctrine will be applied to award
custody to the mother.4 2
A father's chances of proving a mother unfit are restricted by the
refusal of the courts to consider the cause of the parents' separation as
relevant to the issue of the best interests of the child.4 3 Evidence of the
mother's past conduct is admissible only for the limited purpose of
proving present unfitness. Present unfitness can be shown by the immoral
environment created and presently continuing as a result of the mother's
conduct,' her irresponsibility,4 5 her emotional instability,4 6 or similar
compelling reasons.4 7 Whether the mother has forfeited her right to have
the tender years doctrine applied is determined by an inquiry into whether
alleged misconduct has or will directly affect the child.4 8 The courts,
however, will readily forgive even a "serious lapse from moral standards
by the mother, provided her past misconduct will not adversely affect the
best interests of the child."
49
Contumacious conduct in the form of an intentional violation of the
custody order of the courts of another state by fleeing with the child into
37. Id.
38. Commonwealth ex rel. Hickey v. Hickey, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 349, 247 A.2d 806
(1968).
39. PA. STAT. ANN . tit. 48, § 92 (Purdon 1965).
40. Comment, Child Custody: Best Interests of Children vs. Constitutional Rights of
Parents, 81 DICK. L. REV. 733 (1977).
41. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, - Pa. - , 368 A.2d 635 (1977);
Urbani v. Bates, 395 Pa. 187, 149 A.2d 644 (1959).
42. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh, 449 Pa. 105, 296 A.2d 625 (1972).
43. Commonwealth ex rel. Gates v. Gates, 161 Pa. Super. Ct. 423, 55 A.2d 562 (1947).
44. Commonwealth ex rel. Likovich v. Likovich, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 202, 287 A.2d 156
(1971).
45. Commonwealth ex rel. Rainford v. Cirillo, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 591, 296 A.2d 838
(1972).
46. Commonwealth ex rel. Wagner v. Wagner, 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 40, 163 A.2d 708
(1960).
47. Commonwealth ex rel. Shaak v. Shaak, 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 122, 90 A.2d 220 (1952)
(evidence of mother's neglect of child); Commonwealth ex rel. Conrod v. Conrod, 165 Pa.
Super. Ct. 628, 70 A.2d 433 (1950) (mother would place children in institution if in her
custody).
48. Compare Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binney 519 (Pa. 1813) with Common-
wealth v. Addicks & Lee, 2 S. & R. 174 (Pa. 1816).
49. Commonwealth ex rel. Kevitch v. McCue, 165 Pa. Super. Ct. 49, 52, 67 A.2d 582,
583 (1949). Accord, Commonwealth ex rel. Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super. Ct. 210, 166
A.2d 60 (1960).
Pennsylvania is not conduct sufficient to indicate "unfitness. ", 50 Once
Pennsylvania courts have jurisdiction over a child under fourteen years,
the custody determination is made on the basis of presently existing
conditions regardless of prior sister state adjudications. 5' The mother's
interstate flight in defiance of a previous court order is not considered a
compelling reason to defeat application of the tender years doctrine-the
mother may be awarded custody since "the child's best interests, because
of its tender years, will be served by remaining with the mother. "52
Because of this broad application of the doctrine, Pennsylvania may
become the jurisdiction of last resort for mothers who have lost custody
battles in the courts of other states.
53
The custody decisions of Pennsylvania courts encourage a mother,
regardless of her past or present misconduct, to seek custody of her child
and to provide evidence of the father's misconduct. An award of custody
to either parent must be supported by the record of testimony. 54 A father's
burden in building a record that will overcome the tender years doctrine is
very heavy. 55 Not only must he show that the mother's conduct makes her
"unfit" or that by a preponderance of the evidence he is better qualified
to meet the best interests of the child, but he must also ensure that the
record lacks any substantial support for an award of custody to the
mother. A record that merely supports an award of custody to the father is
not necessarily sufficient on appeal. 56 The presumption of the tender
years doctrine may attach to any evidence supportive of an award of
custody to the mother and operate to overcome evidence favoring the
father.
C. The Relationship of the Tender Years Doctrine to Other
Factors Influencing the Custody Decision
While the tender years doctrine is applicable in a wide range of child
custody cases, it is important to comment upon the interaction of the
doctrine with other factors that may influence a court's decision.
57
Among these factors are the child's preference for one parent, 58 the
possibility of keeping siblings together,5 9 the potential loss of jurisdiction
50. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, - Pa. -, 368 A.2d 635 (1977).
51. The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States does not
require recognition of a sister state's determination of child custody. See generally May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Irizarry Appeal, 195 Pa. Super. Ct. 104, 169 A.2d 307 (1961).
52. Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v. Gillard, 203 Pa. Super. Ct. 95, 98, 198 A.2d 377,
378 (1964).
53. Id. But see Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson - Pa. - , 368 A.2d 635
(1977).
54. Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Ulmer, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 144, 331 A.2d 665
(1974).
55. Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 229, 312 A.2d 58
(1973).
56. Id.
57. Brosky & Alford, Sharpening Solomon's Sword: Current Considerations in
Child Custody Cases, 81 DICK. L. REV. 683 (1977).
58. See notes 62-71 and accompanying text infra.
59. See notes 72-75 and accompanying text infra.
over the child, 6° and the continuation of established relationships between
the child and others. 6' The tender years doctrine is significantly involved
--in the resolution of factual issues arising out of the consideration of these
factors.
1. Child's Preference for One Parent.-An expressed preference
of the child to be placed in the father's custody is merely "a factor [to] be
considered but is not controlling, especially where the child is of tender
age." 62 When the child is of tender age, the best interests of the child as
determined by the court will prevail over his or her own preference. 63 A
gray area exists at the upper limits of the tender years; there is some
support for following the preference of an older child. 64 The non-
applicability of the tender years doctrine is not merely a consequence of
chronological age, but rather a result of the maturity and intelligence of a
particular child. 65 Further, the preference of the child must be supported
by articulable reasons. 66 The preference is insufficiently supported if it is
"apparent from the record . . . that the child's preference for his father
stemmed largely from his familiarity with the neighborhood in which his
father lived and the consequent proximity of his friends."67 If a prefer-
ence for the father is to be given priority over the tender years doctrine,
the child must be of superior intelligence 68 or able to report specific
instances of mistreatment or emotional instability in the mother that are
tantamount to compelling reasons for denying custody to the mother.
69
The requirement of articulable reasons for the preference places an
additional burden on the father since a full and complete record is
"especially necessary here to support the decision of the court below
depriving the mother of custody in direct contradiction to the 'tender
years' doctrine." 7 In recognition of the need to create such a record,
60. See notes 76-79 and accompanying text infra.
61. See notes 80-84 and accompanying text infra.
62. Commonwealth ex rel. Baisden v. DeMarco, 215 Pa. Super. Ct. 38, 41, 257 A.2d
365, 366 (1969).
63. Commonwealth ex rel. Hickey v. Hickey, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 349, 247 A.2d 806
(1968).
64. Commonwealth ex rel. Bender v. Bender, 197 Pa. Super. Ct. 397, 178 A.2d 779
(1962).
[A]s children grow older less weight must be given to the tender years doctrine
and more weight must be given to the preference of the children. There are some
cases when, because of the age of the children involved, only one of these
doctrines is applicable.
Id. at 401, 178 A.2d at 780-81.
65. Commonwealth ex rel. Horton v. Burke, 190 Pa. Super. Ct. 392, 154 A.2d 255
(1959).
66. Commonwealth ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 631,98 A.2d 457
(1953).
67. Commonwealth ex rel. Baisden v. DeMarco, 215 Pa. Super. Ct. 38, 41, 257 A.2d
365, 366 (1969) (boy age 8).
68. Commonwealth ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 631,98 A.2d 457
(1953).
69. Cf. Carlisle Appeal, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 181, 310 A.2d 280 (1973).
70. Commonwealth ex rel. Morales v. Morales, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 373, 376 n.1, 294
A.2d 782, 783 n.1 (1972) (parents' lawyers must be present).
many courts have curtailed the traditional practice of holding off-the-
record conferences with the child in chambers.
71
2. Reluctance to Separate Siblings.-Another consideration that
may affect the application of the tender years doctrine is the courts'
reluctance to separate siblings because of the belief that "[i]t is to the
advantage of all children of the same parents that they be reared together
in the family relationship,"- 72 and that siblings "should not be separated
without good reason." 7 3 This factor may work either for or against
fathers. A father may overcome the tender years presumption and receive
custody of a young child if he already has custody of older siblings whose
custody is not an issue in the same case. 74 Conversely, an older child's
preference for the father may be disregarded if the mother has pre-
existing custody of younger siblings.75
3. Desire to Keep the Child Within the Court's Jurisdiction.-
Still another factor may defeat the tender years doctrine. Pennsylvania
courts' concern with keeping the child within their jurisdiction may make
it easier for a father residing in Pennsylvania to overcome the doctrine
when a mother residing in another state or leaving for another seeks to
gain custody in Pennsylvania courts. 76 The courts' concern stems from its
fear of losing control over the future of the child because of the mother's
imminent removal of the child from the jurisdiction. 77 In some cases the
courts have maintained a degree of control and still awarded custody to an
out-of-state mother by requiring her to guarantee payment of round trip
transportation fares for the child to visit the father in Pennsylvania. 78 A
father residing outside Pennsylvania could overcome the tender years
doctrine only by establishing compelling reasons for denying custody to
the mother.
79
4. Maintaining Present Familial Relationships.-In contrast to
the above mentioned factors' potential ability to defeat the tender years
doctrine, the desirability of continuing the present relationship between
the child and the custodian will not normally aid the father in retaining
custody. Although frequently mentioned as a factor in custody cases, the
71. Id.
72. Commonwealth ex rel. Reese v. Mellors, 152 Pa. Super. Ct. 596, 598, 33 A.2d 516,
517 (1943).
73. Id.
74. Cf. Carlisle Appeal, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 181, 310 A.2d 280 (1973).
75. Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 195 Pa. Super. Ct. 262, 171 A.2d 627
(1961). Boy, age 5, had lived for four years with his father's younger brothers but had never
lived with his own sister who was born after his parents' separation.
76. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Rainford v. Cirillo, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 591, 296 A.2d
838 (1972); Commonwealth exreL. Balla v. Wreski, 165 Pa. Super. Ct. 6, 67 A.2d 595 (1949).
77. Commonwealth ex rel. Shipp v. Shipp, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 58, 223 A.2d 906(1966).
78. Commonwealth ex rel. Skurat v. Gearhart, 178 Pa. Super. Ct. 245, 115 A.2d 395
(1955) (mother's personal assurance accepted); Commonwealth ex rel. Keller v. Keller, 90
Pa. Super. Ct. 357 (1927) (mother required to enter bond).
79. Commonwealth ex rel. Conrod v. Conrod, 165 Pa. Super. Ct. 628, 70 A.2d 433
(1950) (not in actual custody of mother, who was guilty of neglect).
interest a child has in remaining in familiar surroundings and continuing
an established personal relationship with the pre-litigation custodian re-
ceives very little support from the courts.8 ° Reference to the potentially
traumatic effect of a change from the existing arrangement usually ap-
pears in decisions continuing custody of a child of tender years in the
mother,8 1 but courts are much less concerned about the possible emotion-
al disturbance that may result to a child from terminating the present
custody of the father.8" The tender years doctrine is such a powerful force
in custody litigation that it can support a transfer of custody to a mother
found to be equally, and thus no better, suited to provide for the child's
best interests than the father who had retained custody for six highly
beneficial years. 83 Obviously, a father can place little reliance upon a
factor so easily overriden by the doctrine.
III. The Doctrine's Unsettled Role
The need for circumventing the tender years doctrine by persuading
the court that other factors should be given greater weight may soon
disappear. The doctrine's status as "one of the strongest presumptions of
the law"8" has been shaken by recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decisions. A review of several of those decisions shows that the proper
role of the doctrine in child custody cases has yet to be clearly
established.
A. Commonwealth ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh
85
The tender years doctrine was displaced as a major factor in the
determination of custody by the majority opinion in the Parikh case.
86
For the first time the Pennsylvania Supreme Court displayed a willingness
to weaken the presumption favoring the mother. The facts of the case,
however, indicate that other considerations influenced the majority's
decision. The child's immigrant parents had separated while on a return
visit to their native India. The father returned to his employment in the
Pittsburgh area with his infant son. Several months later the mother also
returned to Pennsylvania and instituted an action seeking custody of the
child with the overt intent of returning the child to India. The lower
court's award of custody to the father was affirmed despite what the
dissenters deemed to be a lack of factual distinctions between the parents'
80. Cf. Commonwealth exrel. Hickey v. Hickey, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 349, 247 A.2d 806
(1968). Contra, Commonwealth ex rel. Kraus v. Kraus, 185 Pa. Super. Ct. 167, 138 A.2d 225
(1958).
81. Commonwealth ex rel. Shipp v. Shipp, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 58, 223 A.2d 906(1966).
82. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Baisden v. DeMarco, 215 Pa. Super. Ct. 38, 257 A.2d
365 (1969).
83. Commonwealth ex rel. Bender v. Bender, 197 Pa. Super. Ct. 397, 178 A.2d 779
(1962).
84. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super. Ct. 210,215, 166 A.2d
60, 64 (1960).
85. 449 Pa. 105, 296 A.2d 625 (1972).
86. Id.
qualifications sufficient to overcome the tender years doctrine.87 The
majority highlighted three facts from the record in support of its holding
that the best interests of the child required a continuation of the father's
custody. The court found the father to have a slight advantage because he
had a "deep affection for his son" in contrast to the mother who had
"displayed some lack of affection." 88 The Indian climate and diet were
deemed responsible for a minor illness the boy suffered while visiting in
New Delhi.8 9 Furthermore, a change of custody for the two-year-old boy
"would disturb the physical and emotional stability he now enjoys.'' 90
Clearly, the father prevailed only because the majority relegated the
tender years doctrine to the status of a mere "vehicle through which a
decision respecting the infant's custodial well-being may be reached
where factual considerations do not otherwise dictate a different
result.' 91
The three dissenting justices in the Parikh case would have main-
tained the tender years doctrine as a "legal principle, the wisdom of
which is fortified by centuries of experience [and] has been restated over
and over again in Pennsylvania decisions."92 The factual distinctions
relied upon by the majority were criticized as being unsupported by the
total record of the hearing.93 The dissenters found support for awarding
custody to the mother in the necessity of the father's working and being
away from his son and the wealth of the mother's family in India. 94 The
dissent also chided the majority for permitting extraneous considerations
to influence the determination of custody:
[Ilt is quite evident [that] the only basis for the majority deci-
sion is the reluctance to permit the child's departure from the
United States and the resulting hardship on the father incident
to seeing and visiting the child. This, of course, is an unfortu-
nate circumstance to the situation, but it is not sufficient in law
to warrant a denial of the mother's right to custody. 95
B. Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer
96
The doubt thrown upon the force and effect of the tender years
doctrine was somewhat dispelled by the Lucas decision, which applied
the presumption favoring the mother without referring to Parikh. The
mother-appellant in Lucas was granted custody because the justices
found "no compelling reason in [the] record why the mother should be
denied custody." 97 But the impact of the doctrine's reinstatement was
87. Id. at 109-1I, 296 A.2d at 628-29 (Eagen, Roberts, & Pomeroy, JJ., dissenting).
88. Id. at 108, 296 A.2d at 627 (Jones, C.J.).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 109, 296 A.2d 627.
92. Id. at 109, 296 A.2d at 628 (dissenting opinion).
93. Id. at 110-11, 296 A.2d at 628.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 111, 296 A.2d at 629.
96. 450 Pa. 352, 299 A.2d 243 (1973).
97. Id. at 356, 299 A.2d at 246.
lessened by the large role controversial social issues played in the court's
decision. Following her divorce the children's mother had first lived with
and then married Lucas, a black. "The basic reason for the [lower]
court's ruling in granting custody to the father was the existence of the
interracial marriage of the mother and the possible detriment that might
result to the children from living with the mother under such circum-
stances. "" Rather than permit the disapproval of interracial marriages
implied in the holdings of the lower courts, the supreme court reversed
and awarded custody to the mother. 99
The unanimous decision nevertheless left the law of child custody
cases extremely confusing by stating the applicable rule as follows:
In Pennsylvania, supported by the wisdom of the ages, it has
long been the rule that in the absence of compelling reasons to
the contrary, a mother has the right to custody of her children
over any other person, particularly so, where the children are of
tender years. . . .In fact, that the best interests of the children
of tender years will be served under a mother's guidance and
control is one of the strongest presumptions of the law."°
The presumption of the tender years doctrine, discredited by Parikh, was
not fully restored to its former position. In spite of the Lucas decision,
trial courts have been more willing to give greater weight to factors other
than the tender years doctrine in determining the best interests of the child
and to deemphasize the rights of the mother.1 Even the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has continued to attack the doctrine.
C. Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson. I°2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's most recent statement on the
tender years doctrine, Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson,10 3 has
also failed to resolve the complex legal issues surrounding it or to assign
it a definite role in custody proceedings. This case concerned a custody
battle between the parents of a nine-year-old boy. Each parent had taken
the child across state lines to prevent the other from maintaining custody.
The mother's actions violated a Florida court's temporary custody order,
and she had been cited for contempt. After returning to Pennsylvania with
the boy, she moved three times, including an out-of-state move, to avoid
service in the custody action instituted by the father. When service was
finally achieved, the Pennsylvania action resulted in a second award of
custody to the father.
On appeal the superior court reversed the award in favor of the
mother, viewing the father as equally guilty of interstate flight and
placing great reliance on the presumption of the tender years doctrine.' 
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98. Id. at 355, 299 A.2d at 245.
99. 450 Pa. 352, 299 A.2d 243.
100. Id. at 355, 299 A.2d at 245 (citations omitted).
101. Cf. In re Minor Child Terry, 23 Cumb. 107 (Pa. C.P. 1973).
102. - Pa. -, 368 A.2d 635 (1977).
103. Id.
104. 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 9, 17, 323 A.2d 273, 276 (1975).
The lower court's order assigning custody to the father was reinstated by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court primarily because the superior court had
exceeded the proper scope of review. Justice Nix's opinion contained an
important discussion of the tender years doctrine. In the final paragraph
of the opinion the application of the doctrine was severely criticized:
We also question the legitimacy of a doctrine that is predi-
cated upon traditional or stereotypic roles of men and women in
a marital union. Whether the tender years doctrine is employed
to create a presumption which requires the male parent to
overcome its effect by presenting compelling contrary evidence
of a particular nature . . . or merely as a makeshift where the
scales are relatively balanced . . . such a view is offensive to
the concept of the equality of the sexes which we have em-
braced as a constitutional principle within this jurisdiction
. . . . Courts should be wary of deciding matters as sensitive
as questions of custody by the invocation of 'presumptions.'
Instead, we believe that our courts should inquire into the
circumstances and relationships of all the parties involved and
reach a determination based solely upon the facts of the case
then before the Court.1
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Justice Nix's criticism suggests grounds for challenging the doctrine, but
it accomplishes little more. Since less than a majority of the justices
joined in the opinion, it is not a binding precedent. 10 6 Nonetheless,
following Spriggs the doctrine is certain to encounter increasing opposi-
tion, drawing not only on the dicta in Spriggs but also on developments
in other areas of Pennsylvania domestic relations law, 07 in other states'
child custody litigation,108 and in the field of psychology.' 
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IV. Challenging the Tender Years Doctrine
A. Denial of Equal Protection in Procedure by Presumption
The courts of Pennsylvania are directed by statute to base each
determination of child custody on the best interests and permanent wel-
fare of the child.' t 0 The introduction of a presumption that requires the
father to overcome its effect with compelling evidence against the
mother's right to custody shifts the entire focus of the litigation to the
mother's character and capabilities.' 1 ' The diversion from the primary
105. - Pa. -, -, 368 A.2d 635, 639-40 (1977).
106. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 444 Pa. 122, 278 A.2d 895 (1971) (opinion by three
justices has no binding precedential value when four justices concurred in the result).
107. See notes 110-27 and accompanying text infra. Cf. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536,
318 A.2d 324 (1974).
108. Cooke v. Cooke, 21 Md. App. 376, 319 A.2d 841 (Ct. of Special Appeals 1974)
("maternal preference" reduced to function of a tie-breaker).
109. See notes 138-53 and accompanying text infra. Cf. McCord, McCord, & Thurber,
Some Effects of Paternal Absence on Male Children, 64 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 361 (1962).
110. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 92 (Purdon 1965).
Ili. Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 229, 312 A.2d 58
(1973); see Commonwealth ex rel. Shipp v. Shipp, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 58, 223 A.2d 906
(1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Kevitch v. McCue, 165 Pa. Super. Ct. 49,67 A.2d 582 (1949).
objective of the litigation that results from reliance on such formulae has
been criticized as a denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.' 12 In its
holding in Stanley v. Illinois that unwed fathers must be afforded an
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of their fitness to care for the child
before it is taken by the state for placement with foster parents, the United
States Supreme Court stated,
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier
than individualized determination. But when, as here, the pro-
cedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and
care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to
past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the
important interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot
stand. ' 1 3
Placing upon the father the risk of failing to establish a greater level of
parental fitness, by means of a presumption that establishes a prima facie
right to custody in the mother, so frequently forecloses the determinative
issue that fathers, as a class, are denied the equal protection of the law.
In Conway v. Dana114 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied this
view to another area of domestic relations law. The court rejected the
presumption that a father's traditional role as breadwinner was to be
enforced by the law, holding that the mother's income and ability to
support the children were elements to be considered on petition for
reduction of support payments." 5 In reversing the lower court's determi-
nation the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated,
In the matter of child support we have always expressed as the
primary purpose the best interest and welfare of the child. This
purpose is not fostered by indulging in a fiction that the father is
necessarily the best provider and that the mother is incapable,
because of her sex, of offering a contribution to the fulfillment
of this aspect of the parental obligation.'
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Carrying the Conway approach to its logical extension results in the
rejection of the correlative stereotype of mothers as child rearers. In child
custody litigation equal protection demands an examination of each
parent's capacity and fitness as a parent and his or her ability to promote
the child's best interests without resort to unconstitutional presump-
tions."t 7 By presuming that "[w]hen children are of a tender age, their
place is with the mother,"lt8 the courts indulge in exactly the type of
If the mother accepts the implied challenge and turns the argument around to prove the
father unfit, she may win on her prima facie right. The interests of the child are then more
likely to be determined on presumptions rather than relevant facts. See Commonwealth ex
rel. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 403, 205 A.2d 49 (1964).
112. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
113. !d. at 656-57.
114. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 540, 318 A.2d at 326.
117. Id.
118. Urbani v. Bates, 395 Pa. 187, 189, 149 A.2d 644, 644 (1959).
fiction condemned in Conway."9 Rather than placing the burden of proof
on the father in every case regardless of whether he or the mother is
seeking the change of custody, as the tender years doctrine requires, the
courts must make a realistic evaluation of the contribution the father can
make to the future development of the child.' 20 A failure to do so denies
fathers the equal protection of the law through procedure by presumption.
B. Denial of Equal Rights on the Basis of Sex
A second and related ground for attacking the tender years doctrine
is the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion, 12 ' which prohibits distinctions of law imposed solely on the basis of
sex. Arbitrary assignments of rights and duties based upon the attribute of
sex rather than the traits of the individual are prohibited by the amend-
ment.' 2 2 This prohibition applies to common-law presumptions as well as
statutory enactments. 23 Exceptions are not permitted for even "reason-
able" differentiation other than unique physical characteristics. 124 Be-
cause the tender years doctrine grants a significant right to the female
parent and places the male parent at a disadvantage in a custody dis-
pute, 125 it is clear that different burdens and benefits are assigned solely
on the basis of sex. Similar sex-based presumptions have been discarded
under the ERA in other Pennsylvania decisions.1
26
Under Pennsylvania law, no doubt remains that the Equal Rights
Amendment applies to the area of domestic relations. 2 7 No implied
waivers of constitutional rights, such as the protection of the ERA, may
be found from entry of the parties into the marital relationship. 28 Particu-
lar traits, such as care and affection for the children of a marriage, which
have been judicially determined to exist in one sex rather than another,
are no longer valid criteria for discriminating between parents. 129 In
short, sex is not valid as an exclusive classifying tool for the purpose of
establishing procedural or substantive rights. 1
30
119. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
120. See Commonwealth v. Caswell, 96 Dauph. 125 (Pa. C.P. 1973).
121. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28.
122. Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974). See Brown, Emerson,
Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights
for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 893 (1971) (Federal Equal Rights Amendment).
123. Brown, supra note 122, at 953.
124. Id. at 909.
125. Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 229, 312 A.2d 58
(1973).
126. DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 174 (1975) (presumption that all
personal property in marital abode purchased with husband's funds); Henderson v. Hender-
son, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974) (statutory limitation to wife of right to petition for
alimony pendente lite).
127. Karper v. Karper, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 377, 323 A.2d 222 (1974).
128. Compare Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 278, 310 A.2d426(1973),rev'd,
461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d 256 (1975) (issue improperly considered on appeal) with Frank v.
Frank, 14 Leb. 215, 62 D. & C.2d 102 (Pa. C.P. 1973).
129. Contra DeRosa v. DeRosa, 60 Del. 259, 60 D. & C.2d 71 (1972).
130. Cf. Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974) (sex-based dis-
crimination in eligibility for parole violates Equal Rights Amendment).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the ERA to eliminate such
a sex-based presumption in Conway v. Dana 13' as an equal basis for the
decision in that case. The prior practice of assigning the primary burden
of support to the father on the basis of a sex-based stereotype role as
provider for the children was eliminated in non-support cases because it
did not permit proper "regard to the actual circumstances of the par-
ties." 132 Just as the fourteenth amendment language of Conway is appli-
cable by analogy to the tender years doctrine, so is the decision's ERA
reasoning:
Such a presumption is clearly a vestige of the past and incom-
patible with the present recognition of equality of the sexes.
The law must not be reluctant to remain abreast with the de-
velopment of society and should unhesitatingly discard former
doctrines that embody concepts that have since been
discredited ...
We can best provide for the support of minors by avoiding
artificial division of the panoply of parental responsibilities and
looking to the capacity of the parties involved.13
The presumption of the tender years doctrine also hinders the attainment
of the best interests of the child because an individual determination
based on the factual variations in each case is precluded by the require-
ment of proof of compelling reasons to deviate from the predetermined
conclusion that the mother is best suited to have custody of the child.
The ERA continues the trend of social attitudes and economic
experiences that are altering traditional views of the roles men and
women play in family life.' 34 In child support cases, as in custody
litigation, "the primary purpose is the best interests and welfare of the
child."1 35 The child's welfare can best be provided for if courts do not
resort to artificial divisions of the parental roles. 136 When the rights of
each parent vis-a-vis the other in custody litigation are equalized, the
separate interests of the child may finally become the center of the court's
inquiry. 137
C. Validity of the Doctrine is Psychologically Questionable
Not only do the requirements of equal protection and equal rights
indicate the invalidity of the tender years doctrine as a legal presumption,
but the factual basis for the presumption is also questionable. The under-
lying assumption of the tender years doctrine is that the best interests of
the child are served by being in the mother's custody and care' 38 and that
131. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
132. Id. at 539, 318 A.2d at 326.
133. Id. at 539-40, 318 A.2d at 326.
134. See generally Brown, supra note 122.
135. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 540, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (1974).
136. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh, 449 Pa. 105, 296 A.2d 625 (1972).
137. Foster & Freed, supra note 5, at 47. Cf. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d
324 (1974).
138. E.g., Commonwealth exrel. Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super. Ct. 210, 166 A.2d 60
(1960).
her care promotes the stability and continuity of future generations.1
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Recent psychological studies, however, raise serious questions as to the
validity of those factual assumptions and the consequences of the doc-
trine. 40 In many instances the application of the tender years doctrine to
award custody to the mother can be counter-productive. Resulting detri-
mental effects on the child's development include a risk of both delin-
quency and mental illness.1
4 1
The majority of psychological studies that examine the effects of
maternal separation on the development of young children are colored by
the same sexist social and religious views of the role of the mother in the
family constellation that prompt the courts unquestioningly to accept the
tender years doctrine. 42 "[S]tudies purporting to study the effects of
'maternal deprivation' are in fact dealing with the question of parental
deprivation, since there is no systematic empirical data related to children
raised exclusively by their fathers."1 43 Persuasive evidence to challenge
the factual assumption of the tender years doctrine exists, however, in an
article reporting on Canadian studies of children after child custody
awards.' 4 Although it is conceded that further studies are necessary,
45
the important Canadian conclusions were summarized as follows:
[Flor the purpose of custody adjudication it seems to be clear
that a boy experiencing paternal deprivation will suffer as to his
mental attitude; no such conclusion can be drawn in respect to
the effect of paternal deprivation on girls, however.
Apart from the finding . . . that girls whose fathers are
absent become more dependent on their mothers than those
who have not suffered paternal deprivation, no other studies
have detected any adverse effects on girls resulting from pater-
nal deprivation. On the other hand, numerous studies have
shown a wide variety of alleged adverse effects on boys in this
situation ranging from delinquency to several categories of
mental illness. These findings are clearly relevant to the deter-
mination of the best interests of the child.'"
One conclusion from these Canadian studies was "that a boy over the age
of seven is better off with his father."1
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That conclusion is supported by the findings of an earlier study by
McCord, which focused on the effects of paternal absence. 14 In that
139. Commonwealth v. Addicks & Lee, 2 S. & R. 174 (Pa. 1816).
140. McCord, supra note 109.
141. Bradbrook, The Relevance of Psychological and Psychiatric Studies to the Future
Development of Laws Governing the Settlement of Inter-Parental Child Custody Disputes, I I
J. FAMILY L. 557 (1971) (reviewing studies in relation to Canadian child custody decisions).
142. Compare Brown, supra note 122, at 893 with Bradbrook, supra note 141. But cf.
Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 196, 289 A.2d 202 (1972)
(Hoffman, J., dissenting), rev'd, 450 Pa. 352, 299 A.2d 243 (1973).
143. Bradbrook, supra note 141, at 563.
144. Id. at 586.
145. Id. at 585.
146. Id. at 584-85.
147. Id. at 586.
148. McCord, supra note 109.
study the conclusion was drawn that sex role conflict in father-absent
boys related directly to the age at which the deprivation occurs and the
reason for the absence.14 9 Paternal deprivation had the greatest impact on
six to twelve-year-old boys with "normal" mothers and infant to five-
year-old boys with "abnormal" mothers. 150 The "normal" mothers were
characterized as affectionate and non-alcoholic, not sexually promiscu-
ous, and not engaged in criminal activity. 1 ' Those affectionate, "nor-
mal" mothers who pose the greatest danger of developmental difficulties
for the child are precisely the group favored by the tender years doctrine
because compelling reasons to deny custody to such mothers are lack-
ing. 152 While the psychological evidence is not conclusive, it does indi-
cate the potential detriment to the child of relying on the tender years
doctrine to resolve custody disputes. Courts should be made aware of
these factors and proceed on the basis of factual evidence instead of
suspect presumptions concerning the child's best interests.
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V. Conclusion
Pennsylvania law requires that the decision to award custody to one
parent or the other be based on "the fitness of such parent and the best
interests and permanent welfare of the child."' 5 4 The child's best inter-
ests, however, are too frequently determined by the strong presumption
of the tender years doctrine, rather than on the factual evidence pre-
sented.' 55 Notwithstanding the declaration that "[a] reading of reported
cases shows that Pennsylvania Courts have done their part in promoting
the security of our children," '56 it is not at all evident that court awards of
custody in the past two decades have achieved such beneficial results.' 57
In spite of its strong emotional appeal, the tender years doctrine
cannot be justified as promoting the permanent welfare of the child,158
and should be abolished. Along with abolishing the tender years doctrine
on the constitutional and psychological grounds suggested above, the
149. Id.
150. Id. at 364.
151. Id.
152. Compare McCord, supra note 109 with Commonwealth ex rel. Baisden v. De-
Marco, 215 Pa. Super. Ct. 38, 257 A.2d 365 (1969) and Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v.
Johnson, 195 Pa. Super. Ct. 262, 171 A.2d 627 (1961).
153. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d
324 (1974).
154. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 92 (Purdon 1965).
155. Contra, Commonwealth v. Caswell, 96 Dauph. 125 (Pa. C.P. 1973). The court
awarded custody of a boy, age 4, to father, and questioned the weight to be given tender
years doctrine despite Lucas. Id. at 137-38.
156. Sweeney, supra note 8, at 299.
157. See Foster & Freed, supra note 6; cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster,
226 Pa. Super. Ct. 229, 312 A.2d 58 (1973) (critical of inconsistent manner in which criteria
are applied to determine custody).
158. Compare Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binney 519 (Pa. 1813) (girls to mother)
with Commonwealth v. Addicks & Lee, 2 S. & R. 174 (Pa. 1816) (same girls to father) and




present practice of attacking the character and conduct of the parties
should be severely limited by banning such testimony as irrelevant to the
issue of the future best interests of the child. 159 That type of negative
character testimony should be limited strictly to evidence sufficient to
justify removal of a child from its parent under involuntary relinquish-
ment statutes' 60 and proceedings to declare a minor a "deprived
child."'61 These changes in the child custody law of Pennsylvania would
be appropriately supplemented by the requirement that the record must
show affirmatively the manner in which an award of custody to a particu-
lar parent will benefit the child. Neither parent should be granted custody
without first establishing by a preponderance of the non-character evi-
dence that an award of custody to him or her will serve the best interests
of the child.
The proper relationship of the interests of the child, the parents, and
the state must be recognized and maintained. Only the objective of
providing for the permanent welfare of the child justifies the state in
exercising a determinative role through the judicial system.' 62 The rights
of the parents to custody are equal'6 3 and superior to those of the state or
any other person.'(" A choice between the parents can be supported only
on criteria that provide for the child's best interests,' 65 which are and
should remain superior to all other considerations. 166
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159. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 229, 312 A.2d 58
(1973).
160. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 311 (Purdon 1975). Grounds for involuntary termination are
specified as follows:
The rights of parents in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed
pursuant to section 312, and a hearing held pursuant to section 313, on the ground
that:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months either has
evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child, or has
refused or failed to perform parental duties; or
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of the
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subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be
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(3) The parent is the presumptive but not the natural father of the child.
161. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. I1, § 50-102(4) (Purdon 1975):
(4) "Deprived child" means a child who: (i) is without proper parental care or
control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control
necessary for his mental, or emotional health, or morals; or (ii) has been
placed for care or adoption in violation of law; or (iii) has been abandoned by
its parents, guardian, or other custodian; or (iv) is without a parent, guardian,
or legal custodian; or (v) while subject to compulsory school attendance is
habitually and without justification truant from school.
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